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THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF MARRINER S. ECCLES
L. Dwight Israelsen *
Our depression was not brought about as a result of extravagance . . .. The
difficulty is that we were not sufficiently extravagant as a nation. We did Mt
consume what we were able to produce. . . . The theory of hard work and thrift
as a means ofpulling us out is unsound economically. True hard work means
more production, but thrift and economy mean less consumptWn . . .. There is
only one agency in my opinion that can turn the cycle upward and that is the
Government. . .. The Government must so regulate, through its power of
taxation, through its power over the control of money and credit, and hence its
volume, the ecoMmic structure so as to give men who are able, and worthy and
willing to work the opportunity to work and to guarantee to them sustenance for
their families and protection against want and destitution.
Marriner S. Eccles, 1932
Yours was the only revolution on record that entered government by way of a
central bank.
John Kenneth Galbraith to Marriner S. Eccles, 1976
I believe [Eccles] played a far greater role in the development of what came later
to be called Keynesian policies than did Keynes or any of his disciples.
Milton Friedman, 1983

On July 29, 1983, the Federal Reserve Building in Washington, D.C. was
formally named in honor of Marriner S. Eccles, the successful Utah banker and
businessman who served as Governor of the Fed, 1934-36, as Chairman of the Board
of Governors, 1936-48, and as a member of the Board, 1948-51. While Eccles was
honored primarily for his struggle to maintain Federal Reserve independence to
conduct monetary policy, his role in introducing "compensatory" monetary and fiscal
policies--modern macroeconomic stabilization policies--was undoubtedly of equal or
greater importance. In tracing the development of Eccles' macroeconomic philosophy,
this study identifies him as one of the earliest American precursors to Keynes and
as the most important figure in the introduction of "Keynesian" economic policies in
the United States.
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In February 1933, the Finance Committee of the United States heard
testimony on the causes and cures' of the depression. While farmers argued for
remonetization of silver as a means of recovery, and labor spokesmen suggested
reduced hours and work weeks, the majority of the forty-six prominent Americans
who testified were of the opinion that the depression represented the workings of
natural economic law, a punishment for the "extravagance" of the Twenties, and that
to interfere with the cycle of boom and bust was to invite disaster. "We should make
one single and invariable dictum the theme of every discourse," said Bernard Baruch,
summarizing the common view, "balance budgets, stop spending money we haven't
got. Sacrifice for frugality and revenue. Cut government spending--cut it as rations
are cut in a siege. Tax--tax everybody for everything. ,,1
In this view, Baruch was reflecting the political wisdom of the day. While
Congress had approved a major tax cut shortly after the crash of late 1929, the large
federal budget deficits which accompanied the disastrous decline in national income
had led to a reversal of tax policy, with both political parties in the 1932 campaign
advocating a balanced federal budget as the key to economic recovery.

The

Democratic P~ty platform called for "a federal budget balanced on the basis of
accurate executive estimates within revenues" and included a provision for reducing
the size of government by 25 percent through massive cuts in expenditure programs.
In an effort to reduce the deficit, Congress had passed in 1932 what was to that point
the largest tax increase in U.S. history. Toward the end of the hearings, Marriner
S. Eccles [who had been invited to participate by Senator William H. King as a favor
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to a nephew who was a long-time friend of Eccles] was called to testify. Eccles, 43
years old,. was a successful Utah banker and industrialist, a "conservative
Republican whose formal schooling had ended after three years of high school, but
II

whose business acumen had enabled him to bring various interests through the worst
years of the depression relatively unscathed.
In his testimony, Eccles identified the cause of the depression as an
insufficiency of effective demand, rather than punishment for past extravagances, loss
of confidence, or workings of natural law, as those' before him had suggested. The
cure, Eccles stated, was a restoration of sufficient spending to purchase the quantity
of goods which it was possible to produce at full employment. Because the profit
motive could be expected to lead individuals, business, and financial institutions to
make'decisions which would further reduce spending, hence, income and employment,
the government, motivated not by profits, but by the welfare of the public, must
compensate by spending more.

"I see no way of correcting this situation except

through Government action," Eccles declared. 2 He then proceeded to outline a
five-point program of unemployment relief, public works, agricultural allotment, farm
mortgage refinancing, and permanent settlement of interallied debts to deal with the
immediate problems of the depression. He also proposed a plan for long-run economic
stability that included unification of the banking system under the Federal Reserve
and the creation of an agency to guarantee bank deposits; tax reform to achieve a
more equitable distribution of wealth and purchasing power; passage of national child
labor, minimum wage, unemployment insurance, and old age pension laws; federal
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agencies to approve all new capital issues offered to the public and all foreign
financing, all means of transportation, and all means of communication to insure
their operation in the public interest; and a national planning board to coordinate
public and private economic activities. 3

Eccles' testimony was received by the

Finance Committee with a mixture of interest, skepticism, disbelief, and outright
hostility. Three years later, a cover story in Time Magazine evaluated his 1933
proposals in the following terms: "Eccles laid before a Senate committee a plan,
which turned out to be nothing less than a detailed blueprint of the New Deal. Only
one Eccles suggestion has not materialized--official cancellation of War Debts. 1t4
The issue of primacy in intellectual or scientific discovery is often difficult or
impossible to resolve.' The development-of "Keynesian" thought on both sides of the
Atlantic is a case in point. While Keynes did not publish his General Theory until
1936, antecedent strands of what eventually became known as Keynesian theory can
be traced back to the early 1930s and earlier. Eccles was only one of several who
claimed to have developed the theory of compensatory finance independently as early
as 1931. The purpose of this essay is not to answer definitively the question, "Who
first had the idea?"--an impossible task, but rather to address another question,
"Who, among the early proponents of compensatory economic stabilization was most
responsible for the acceptance of 'Keynesian' analysis in the formulation of U.S.
economic policy?" That the answer to the question is, most likely, "Marriner Eccles,"
is both the conclusion of the study and a testimony to the power of the ideas we now
associate with Keynes. It is also testimony to the intellectual power and integrity of
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Eccles, who, at the age of 41, determinedly followed his logic to unorthodox and
unpopular conclusions, in spite of an upbringing, background, and profession which
would seem to make him the most unlikely of revolutionaries. The discussion of
Eccles' economic philosophy and his impact on U.S. economic policy which follows is
based primarily on his papers, now on deposit in the Special Collections Library at
the University of Utah, supplemented by published works dealing with Eccles and by
correspondence and conversations with economists who associated with him during
his public years and later. Information and opinions offered by Lauchlin Currie,
Richard A. Musgrave, Evsey D. Domar, Charles P. Kindleberger, Herbert Stein, John
Kenneth Galbraith, and Milton Friedman have been particularly valuable.
I. Changing Views

We must acknowledge that progress comes only through toil, economy,
and thrift, and that these alone are the motive power which creates the
enduring structure.
Marriner S. Eccles, 1925
The matter of economy is negative, the matter of spending is positive, and
we have been doing the negative thing rather than the positive. We have
been preaching the negative doctrine. . .. Our depression was not
brought/about as a result of extravagance. . .. The difficulty is that we
were not sufficiently extravagant as a nation. We did not consume what
we were able to produce. . . . We are trying to apply a theory of economy
as obsolete as the Ark.
Marriner S. Eccles, 1932
Marriner Eccles' father, David, was Utah's first native millionaire. Born in
poverty in Glasgow, Scotland, in 1849, David had emigrated from Scotland with his
family--blind father, mother, and seven children--in 1863, after their conversion to
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Mormonism. The move from Scotland to Utah was a move from urban poverty to
frontier poverty, but through hard work and unrelenting economy, David Eccles
achieved the American dream. By the time he died in 1912, Eccles, who had been
illiterate when he arrived in Utah at the age of fourteen and who was barely literate
as an adult, had founded fifty-four separate enterprises. He owned real property in
seven states and in Canada, and was president of seven banks and sixteen industrial
corporations.

He was an officer of forty-seven corporate enterprises, and his

companies were among the leaders in the West in mining, manufacturing, refining,
construction, agriculture, and finance. His estate was appraised at more than $7
million. 5
Marriner Stoddard Eccles was the eldest of nine children born to David Eccles'
second wife. Marriner's father, a polygamist, had twelve other children by his first
wife.

The success Marriner experienced in consolidating and expanding the

fragmented holdings his family inherited on the death of his father has been
well-documented elsewhere. 6 In addition to property, Marriner Eccles inherited from
his father a set of beliefs about the proper roles of individuals and government in the
functioning ofJthe economic system. The invisible hand of laissez-faire capitalism
would automatically combine resources in a way which would most efficiently
increase production, wealth, consumption, and provide for a continually rising
standard of living for all who participated. The role of government should be limited
to "maintaining confidence" through strict budget-balancing at all times, while the
greatest benefit would be received by those who worked hard, practiced strict
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economy, and invested prudently. Confidence promoted saving, and saving financed
new productive investment.

If, by chance, a panic or depression disrupted the

system, it was only a temporary, self-correcting adjustment which would disappear
once the necessary bankruptcies and liquidations had occurred.

Economic

dislocations could be handled by private charity, and the West provided an ideal place
for those dislocated to begin anew. 7 "We must acknowledge," Eccles told Utah
bankers in 1925, "that progress comes only through toil, economy, and thrift, and that
these alone are the motive power which creates the enduring structure. ,,8 These
beliefs, accepted without question by Marriner Eccles in prosperous times, stayed
with him until early in 1931 when, by his own account:
I saw for the first time that though I'd been active in the world of
finance and production for seventeen years and knew its techniques, I
knew less than nothing about its economic and social effects. The
discovery of my ignorance, however, did not by itself lead anywhere.
Friends whose estates I managed, my family, whose interests I
represented, and the community at large, in whose economic life I
played a sensitive role, all expected me to find a way out of the economic
trap we were all in. Yet all I could find within myself was despair.
Having been reared by my father to accept the responsibilities of wealth
and having been placed by circumstances at the helm of many
enterprises, there were times when I felt the whole depression was a
personal affront. Wherein had I been at fault? Night after night
following my headsplitting awakening, I would return home exhausted
by the pretensions of knowledge I was forced to wear in a daytime
masquerade. I would slump forward on a table and pray that the
answers I was groping for would somehow be revealed. As an individual
I felt myself helpless to do anything. 9
Marriner Eccles had run aground on the shoals of macroeconomics.

His

discovery of ignorance was reflected in his public addresses. In a speech entitled,
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"Banking as Related to Economic Conditions," delivered at a Bank Management
Conference in Salt Lake City on March 26, 1931, Eccles said:
Under conditions of prosperity little thought or attention is given to an
analysis to determine factors creating prosperity or even normality ....
The same thought and consideration should be given to an analysis of
economic conditions in periods of prosperity as are given in periods of
depression as it is necessary to avoid the mistakes of the former if we
are going to prevent the distress of the latter.
For nearly two years now the world has been going through a
major economic readjustment of great intensity, creating suffering and
hardship on the part of many millions of people. Everyone is interested
in a solution and there has been a great deal of discussion allover the
world as to the causes of the present depression and what the remedies
may be. The solution assuredly is not an easy one and will not correct
itself as some people like to believe .... The causes lie too deep and
are too complex and wide-spread to be removed easily . . . . The modern
system by which society supplies its wants is a complicated one. I t is
a wonderfully effective organization when in balance with every branch,
but if anything happens to throw it out of balance it is possible (to have
millions of people unable to buy the products of others because they
cannot sell their own. Something has happened, which has affected the
buying power of millions of people, and other millions are trying to
ignore it. 10
Eccles had by this ' point rejected the idea of the automatic restoration of
economic prosperity through the workings of the invisible hand of narrow
self-interest. He had discovered the fallacy of composition and had concluded that
"intelligent and courageous" open-market purchases by the Fed could have averted
the drastic deflation which followed the crash. He also found in the writings of
William Trufant Foster, a leading economic heretic since the 1920s, a basic
explanation of and suggested cure for the depression which squared with Eccles' own
principal experiences and observations. Foster argued that the widely-held view that
the depression was the result of extravagant spending in the Twenties was the exact
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reverse of the truth.

"Far from having been profligate, the nation wasted its

substance in riotous saving, " he argued. U nderconsumption, rather than undersaving
was the culprit, since industry stops making goods and hiring labor "solely because
it cannot sell the goods."

Foster also argued that the "lazy fairies" of private

enterprise could not be expected to reverse the decline in purchasing power by
producing or investing without expectation of sales or profits. Since, in Foster's view,
an increase in consumer purchasing power was the only sound way to quickly end the
depression, public enterprise was the only alternative. Foster concluded that the
federal government should deliberately increase the national debt by spending for
public works and by tax reductions in order to increase aggregate purchasing power
and end "t he depression.!! During the period 1931-33, Eccles developed and extended
the underconsumption theory, buttressed it with an impressive array of statistics,
and by 1933 had arrived at the essential framework of "Keynesian" analysis and
policy. The evolution of his thinking can be identified in his public addresses of 1932
and 1933. Speaking on the subject "Depression--Its Causes, Effects, and Suggested
Remedies" before the Utah State Bankers Convention on June 17, 1932, Eccles
declared:
I believe, contrary to the opinion of most people, that the depression
within our own country was primarily brought about by our capital
accumulation getting out ofbalance and relationship to our consumption
ability. . .. Our depression was not brought about as a result of
extravagance. . .. We did not consume as a nation more than we
produced . . . .
The difficulty is that we were not sufficiently
extravagant as a nation. We did not consume what we were able to
produce . . . . In other words, we have lost sight of the fact that the end
of production is consumption and not money.
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Eccles mentioned the fallacy of composition problem and the futility and perversity
of federal government efforts to balance the budget as a means to recovery:
The matter of efficiency where it means the reduction of labor and
laying off of men ... must defeat its own purpose, and we have been
going on here for a period of more than three years, each attempting to
solve his own problem by the process of laying people off, by the process
of reduction of wages and salaries, and by the process of cutting every
possible expenditure that it was possible to cut, and when we finally get
through the process we find that we are just where we were when we
began because everybody else is doing the same thing, without
accomplishing our purpose, but merely reducing the standard of living,
with a constant decrease in consumption . . .. N ow, I do not say that
we can do anything else because as individuals, as corporations, we are
forced to balance our budget. We have no power to regulate the
question of credit or money and each one must scramble to protect
himself until something is done to bring about a turn, but the
disappointing thing in all of this is that the Government ... which is
the one agency that has the power to regulate the value of
money ... has now adopted a policy of deflation.
They are advocating economy and discharging men and reducing
the purchasing power. They are only following the same trend that all
individuals and corporations have been forced to follow. We hear the
necessity of balancing the budget. . .. It may be well for them to
consider that the production of wealth is accomplished by mental and
physical effort and that when people are unemployed or employed on
part time you stop the production of wealth at the very source, and just
to the extent that unemployment increases, just to that extent are you
going to find it more impossible to pay debts and collect taxes, and to
balance any budget--Government or any other budget. It seems to me
that it would be well for us to recognize the fact that our national
income today is approximately thirty billion dollars less than it was in
1929, or a loss in national income of about two and one-half billion
dollars a month. Due to what? Due to the loss of employment, due to
the decrease in consumption, due to a lower standard of living. And yet
we worry and we talk about the failure to balance the budget by a
billion dollars, and at the same time we are losing through
unemployment possibly two billion dollars a month.
Alternative theories of the causes of depression were discussed and dismissed:
When you look over this country ... and realize that possibly a third of
our population do not have any of the modern facilities and
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conveniences--do not know what it is to use electricity, ... you will
realize that we do not have over-production for our needs, but merely
lack of buying power because of unemployment.
N ow I do not say that a greater consumption and higher standard
of living may make better people. If we are going to assume that we
have got to have a chastisement and a punishment as a result of our
extravagances, then I suppose we have got to go through these
depressions, these devastations and destruction, this breaking down of
morale every so often, but if we are going to be scientific and if men are
going to be equal to the machine that they have created then we are
going to recognize that as medical science has developed in the
elimination of many virulent diseases, so can economics advance in the
elimination of these disastrous, destructive, unnecessary depressions.
These are not acts of God, they are mistakes of man, and I do not
believe they are punishment meted out to us.
Traditional theories of economic recovery were also discarded:
The economic conceptions that affected the conditions in this country
when we were a debtor nation, when we had frontiers to develop, do not
in any way affect the situation today. The theory of hard work and
thrift as a means of pulling us out is unsound economically. True hard
work means more production, but thrift and economy mean less
consumption. Now reconcile those two forces, will you? We do not want
capital accumulation in the sense that we need to add to our plant
facilities. We do not want credit. . .. People who want credit want to
borrow it from you to pay somebody else. That's all. People are not
going to use credit to put men to work until they get a demand for the
thing they produce, and they are not going to get a demand for the thing
they produce until you create employment, give buying power to the
consumer.
"Now for the solution of our problem," Eccles said. "How are you going to put
these people back to work? There is only one agency in my opinion that can turn the
cycle upward and that is the Government."
If a man owed himself he could not be bankrupt, and neither can
a nation. We have got all of the wealth and resources we ever had, and
we do not have the sense, the financial and political leadership to know
how to use them. We are trying to apply a theory of economy as
obsolete as the Ark.
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If the Government in order to finance the war could spend billions
of dollars in order to give protection to life and property, and not have
one single"thing to show for it when it is over but the destruction of the
flower of the youth of the nation, then certainly the Government is
justified in supplying sufficient credit or money to take care of the
unemployed through public works, or an unemployment wage or a
combination of both ... the Government, if it is worthy of the support,
the loyalty, and the patriotism of its citizens, must so regulate, through
its power of taxation, through its power over the control of money and
credit, and hence its volume, the economic structure so as to give men
who are able, and worthy and willing to work, the opportunity to work
and to guarantee to them sustenance for their families and protection
against want and destitution. 12
Eccles had further developed and refmed his ideas by 1933. His address to the
Utah Education Association on October 27, entitled "Reconstructing Economic
Thinking, II began with a statement of perspective on the development of his own
thinkipg in the area of macroeconomics. Ifl do not profess to be an economist, If he
began. liThe views which I here express are the result of personal observations and
study made in the field of active business and financial life. It
I think up until the time of the depression I was fully as orthodox
in my economic and financial conceptions as any of the most
conservative bankers and business leaders. This for the reason that I
had been so absorbed by the fascination of the financial and business
game that I had not stopped to consider the fundamental and
underlying purpose of it all. I had not answered for myself the question,
IIWhat is an economic system for?" With the development of the past
four years I have been forced to greatly change most of my former
conceptions which I had grown up with due to the numerous paradoxes
which I have been confronted with on every hand. 13
Eccles then argued that changes in the world during the preceding 150 years
had reduced or eliminated many of the forces which had led to spontaneous recovery
from depressions in the past, a point he had made forcefully in his Senate Finance
Committee testimony earlier that year:
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Our individual evolution has made necessary a new economic
philosophy, a new business point of view and fundamental changes in
our social system. The nineteenth century economics will no longer
serve our purpose--an economic age 150 years old has come to an end.
The orthodox capitalistic system of uncontrolled individualism, with its
free competition, will no longer serve our purpose. We must think in
terms of the scientific, technological, interdependent machine age, which
can only survive and function with a modified ca~italistic system
controlled and regulated from the top by government. 4
.
"In the past," he told Utah educators, "the usual way out of depressions has
been through a revival of new investments by the expenditure of private capital."
... Our orthodox economic thinkers assume that this will repeat
itself and they advocate b~ing quiet and waiting, assuming that the
financial processes will take us out of the depression, while at the same
time our banks hold hundreds of millions of cash reserves sufficient to
extend credit by eight to ten billion of dollars on a basis of our present
gold reserve without requiring any change in the gold value of our
dollar. With this capacity for almost ·u nlimited credit expansion our
financial institutions continue the contraction of credit and new
investments are almost at the zero point . . . .
The assumption of spontaneous revival through new investment
has always rested on the fallacious belief that people and banks will not
indefinitely hold money in idleness. This is a false idea, as this
depression is beginning to prove. The question is not how bankers and
those who have idle money and credit can bring about recovery, but why
they should do so, so lo,?! as there is no incentive offered in any field for
profitable investment.!
The breakdown of the "invisible hand" in the macroeconomy was clearly stated

to the Finance Committee:
We see now, after nearly four years of depression, that private
capital will not go into public works on self-liquidating projects except
through government and that if we leave our "rugged individual" to
follow his own interest under these conditions he does precisely the
wrong thing. Each corporation for its own protection discharges men,
reduces payrolls, curtails its orders for raw materials, postpones
construction of new plants and pays off bank loans, adding to the
surplus of unusable funds. Every single thing it does to reduce the flow
of money makes the situation worse for business as a whole.!6
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The banking system was,subject to the same problem: "Our banking system
as a whole is not responsible for the depression any more than any other branch of
our capitalistic economy of individualism . ..

In times of depression, when prices

break, banks are forced to contract credit as rapidly as possible in order to protect
deposi tors. ,,17
Eccles, however, rejected the idea that a shortage of currency in circulation was
responsible for the continuation of the depression. "There is no shortage of currency
in circulation at the present time," he said. The problem was "due to the amount of
currency which is hoarded and the lack of velocity of existing currency . . . . The need
is not for more money, but for more spending."lS
If a shortage of currency did not cause the Depression, neither did a shortage
of credit. Said Eccles:
If it is credit we need, why do not, say, 200 of our great
corporations controlling 40 per cent of our industrial output that are in
such shape that they do not need credit--they have great amounts of
surplus funds--if it is credit that is needed why do they not put men to
work? Why do not those great institutions put men to work? For the
very reason that there is not a demand for goods. 19
To the view that recovery was dependent on the establishment of "sound
money," Eccles commented:
It seems to me that sound money is merely money which
maintains or increases in its purchasing power. Unsound money is
money which continues to decline in its purchasing power. The
goodness or the badness is the extent of the appreciation or depreciation
after the money is issued. . .. The only security of any issue of money
is a right course of future events measured by sufficient spending to
maintain a price structure in relation to the value of money when it was
created. Believers in sound money are deluded when they think they
have ways of foretelling its future value. For the past two years or more
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we have had the painfully sound dollar measured by its purchasing
power in terms of goods and services. The sounder it got the further
prices fell and the more unemployment increased. Had the policy of
economy and budget balancing on the part of the Government continued,
it would have soon been so sound that all of our credit institutions
would have been closed, there would have been no bank money and all
of the people would have been starving to death with an abundance of
everything for everybody, or at least the willingness and power to
produce it ....
Our sound money friends seem to be terrified lest the Government
unbalance its budget and spend enough money to give the shivering and
undernourished millions of unemployed unsound money in return for
productive labor so that the great quantities of now unsaleable goods
and unrentable housing might be bought and utilized. The sound money
people say that the credit to build factories, which are now idle, and
credit to foreign governments, which they can now only pay in goods,
was sound a few years ago, but money created by Government fmancing
and spent by it for relief, public works, housing, and slum clearance,
would not now be sound because not self-liquidating and
profit-yielding ....
The great struggle in America today is between the people who
believe in what they call sound money and the people who believe in the
right to eat and the right to work. ·
"There is no security for anyone except in a steady production, a balanced
distribution, and a responsible humane government. There can be no security for the
thrifty or the worker [in a state which] allows production to become paralyzed and
millions of men to go without work. In such a state, sound money is not only a
travesty but a tragedy," Eccles concluded. 20
By 1933, Eccles had concluded that only the government was in a position to
stimulate economic recovery. "Financial fuel is piled up," he said,
--the Government, and not the bankers, must apply the torch. Motives
of public welfare must lead us out of the present depression as greed
and war have led the world out of past depressions.... The
Government, unlike the bankers, has the power of taxation and power
to create money and does not have to depend on the profit motive. 21

17
"If my analysis is correct," said Eccles,
we can not expect private investors to draw their money from the banks
and put it into circulation through providing capital for new investment;
neither can we expect those who have credit to use that credit for a
similar purpose under present conditions. We must then depend upon
the Government to save what we have of a price, profit and credit
system.
The only escape from a depression must be by increased spending.
In the absence of new fields for investment in a world already glutted
with unsaleable products, the only way to increase spending is for the
Government to spend it for nonprofit-yielding works for the benefit of
all, for the expansion of social services of all kinds, or for war . . . . War
certainly is the worst way to provide the means for more spending ....
It is unfortunate to have to kill people in order to spend enough to
consume the goods necessary to keep people employed.
"This argument is not against consumption," Eccles emphasized, "but it is
against the bad type of consumption which is constituted by war. ,,22
In

defen~ng

government expenditures on public works before the Senate

Finance Committee, Eccles also contrasted those expenditures with war expenditures
in the following exchange.
Senator Walsh of Massachusetts: "We can go to extremes of waste in the
matter of public works if we are not very careful."

Mr. Eccles: "Of course we are losing $2 billion per month in unemployment.
J

I can conceive of no greater waste than the waste of reducing our national income
about half of what it was. I cannot conceive of any waste as great as that."
Senator Walsh: "Your suggestion is that we meet it by borrowing large sums
of money in performing works.
taxation, . . . .

tI

That the people have got to pay for it in
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Mr. Eccles:
No, they would not pay for it now. There are times to borrow and there
are times to pay. The Government borrowed during the war $27 billion,
and we got prosperity even though all they borrowed was wasted, every
dollar of it. There could be no waste in post offices or in roads or in
schools. You would have something to show for it. With war all you
have left is the expense of taking care of maimed and crippled and sick
veterans. That is what is left from war. And it is all wastage.
On

balancing

the

government

budget,

Eccles

had

the

following

observations: "In the light of this record," he asked the Finance Committee,
is it consistent for our political and financial leadership to demand at
this time a balanced Budget by the inauguration of a general sales tax,
further reducing the buying power of our people?
Is it necessary to conserve Government credit to the point of
providing a starvation existence for millions of our people in a land of
superabundance? Is the universal demand for Government economy
consistent at this time? Is the present lack of confidence due to an
unbalanced budget?
What the public and the businessmen of this country are
interested in is a revival of employment and purchasing power. This
would automatically restore confidence and increase profits to a point
where the Budget would automatically be balanced in just the same
manner as the individual corporation, State, and city budget would be
balanced.
Today we are losing close to two billions per month of national
income due to unemployment, resulting in the inability of our people to
purchase the goods necessary to sustain our production. Is there any
program of economy and Budget balancing on the part of our
Government as important as to stop this great loss and all the attendant
human suffering, devastation, and destruction?
With circumstances so serious, the failure of political and financial leaders to
take corrective action was, in Eccles' mind, inexcusable.

"The breakdown of our

present economic system," he asserted, "is due to the failure of our political and
financial leadership to intelligently deal with the money problem." Unless corrective
measures were taken, Eccles predicted, "we can only expect to sink deeper in our
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dilemma and distress, with possible revolution, with social disintegration, with the
world in ruins, the network of its financial obligations in shreds, with the very basis
of law and order shattered .... " "Why risk such a catastrophe," he asked, "when it
can be averted by aggressive measures in the right direction on the part of the
Government. ,,23
"I t is a national disgrace," he told the Finance Committee, "that such suffering
should be permitted in this, the wealthiest country in the world."
The present condition is not the fault of the unemployed, but that
of our business, financial, and political leadership. It is incomprehensible that the people of this country should very much longer
stupidly continue to suffer the wastes, the bread lines, the suicides, and
the despair, and be forced to die, steal, or accept a miserable pittance in
the form of charity which they resent, and properly resent. We shall
either adopt a plan which will meet this situation under capitalism, or
a plan will be adopted for us which will operate without capitalism ....
You have got to take care of the unemployed or you are going to have a
revolution in this country.24

II. Compensatory Economics
Financial fuel is piled up--the Government, and not the bankers, must
apply the torch. Motives ofpublic welfare must lead us out of the present
depression as greed and war have led the world out ofpast depressions.
)
Marriner S. Eccles, 1933
I see nothing in our economic organization to lead me to believe that
business stability will ever come about by itself. I think that without a
fair measure of stability the system will not survive. I hope and I believe
that the inherent instability of capitalism may be corrected by conscious
and deliberate use of three compensatory instruments, taxation, varying
governmental expenditures, and monetary control . . .. It should be
evident by now that simple maxims and rules of thumb are not sufficient.
Marriner S. Eccles, 1935
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The Government must be looked upon as a compensatory agency in this
economy to do just the opposite of what private business and individuals
do~ The latter are necessarily motivated by the desire for profit. The
former must be motivated by social obligation.
Marriner S. Eccles, 1936
By the mid-1930s, Eccles' compensatory policy recommendations were based
on a sophisticated macroeconomic analysis which covered the consumption function;
the multiplier; a distinction between the relative sizes of the government expenditure
and transfer-tax multipliers; leakages and injections; causes of inflation; liquidity
trap; velocity; the transmission mechanism of monetary influences; the Phillips curve;
the relationships among increases in the money supply, productivity increases, and
inflation; the role of inflationary and deflationary expectations; income and wealth
distribution; the coordination of monetary, fiscal, and incomes policies; and the
interrelationships between domestic stabilization policies and international
movements of goods and capital. While he never attempted the construction of a
formal model, all of the elements of "Keynesian" analysis, with the possible exception
of the accelerator, may be found in his speeches, letters, and memos.
All policies which came under Eccles' scrutiny were examined for stabilization
implications. JAs an example, Eccles felt that Social Security taxation should be
deliberately controlled in a counter-cyclical fashion, with increases in rates during
booms and reductions during depressions. Taxation in general should be used mainly
as a means of redistributing income from wealthy individuals and corporations to low
and middle-class consumers who had, Eccles believed, higher marginal propensities
to consume:
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"The fundamental economic plans, when they are finally established," he said
in 1933, "will of necessity center in the distribution of purchasing power and in the
allocation of income between investment and expenditures .... "
These plans will involve public and semi-public expenditure on an
expanding scale for cultural and quasi-cultural services. They will
involve relief of taxation that rests on the consumer; the reduction of
sales taxes, of real estate taxes, of tariffs, and of public service charges.
They will involve the establishment of heavy income taxes especially in
upper brackets. They will involve heavy taxation of undistributed
corporate surplus, to force corporation income into dividends and
taxes. 25
A good summary statement by Eccles on compensatory policy was delivered in
1935, when he declared his hope that "the inherent instability of capitalism may be
corrected by conscious
and deliberate
use of three compensatory instruments,
.
.
taxation, varying governmental expenditures, and monetary control .... It should
be evident by now," he said, "that simple maxims and rules of thumb are not
sufficient. ,,26

III. The Future of Capitalism
The present condition is not the fault of the unemployed, but that of our
business, financial, and political leadership. It is incomprehensible that
the people of this country should very much longer stupidly continue to
suffer the wastes, the bread lines, the suicides, and the despair, and be
forced to die, steal, or accept a miserable pittance in the form of
charity . . .. We shall either adopt a plan which will meet this situation
under capitalism, or a plan will be adopted for us which will operate
without capitalism. . .. You have got to take care of the unemployed or
you are going to have a revolution in this country."
Marriner S. Eccles, 1933
If [compensatory monetary and fiscal policy instruments] are not
established or if they are not successful in achieving economic
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stability . .. you will not have compensatory but direct controls in every
important sphere of economic activity.
Marriner S. Eccles, 1935
Eccles recognized, as did Schumpeter, Marx, and Keynes, the instability of the
unfettered capitalist system: "If there is one thing [that] seems clear it is that unless
conscious effort is made to prevent them, booms and collapses will continue to occur
in capitalistic democracies," he observed in 1935. His analysis of the business cycle
rested on a credit limit which marked the ceiling to expansion, and a multiplier effect
which resulted from reduced spending by overextended consumers as well as
liquidation of bad investments which characterized the downturn.

Like Keynes,

however, Eccles did not foresee automatic recovery, since he did not subscribe to the
view that idle funds would not be held indefinitely by individuals, banks, and
corporations. Like Schumpeter, Eccles saw corporations as playing a role in the
problems of capitalism, not necessarily by destroying the role of the entrepreneur (of
which group Eccles had long been a successful member), but by holding large sums
of unused funds during periods of recession and depression.
Eccles, also like Schumpeter, was interested in the preservation of
capitalism--but not for its own sake: "There is nothing sacred about the capitalist
economic system. It is merely an economic organization which society has developed
in its quest to satisfy its wants," he said in 1935.
If I wish to preserve capitalism it is because I think that a
smoothly-functioning democratic capitalistic system offers a better
guarantee of what is generally termed the good life than does a
capitalistic dictatorship, or socialism, or communism.
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If, then, we regard capitalism simply as a particular economic
organization of society, our defense of, or attack on, that organization
must be directed toward its effectiveness--its ability to satisfy in an
adequate and equitable fashion the material needs of mankind. If it
cannot be defended on these grounds it is doomed. The doctrine of
divine right of kings did not save Charles the First's head nor will the
doctrine of the sacred rights of property save capitalism. People want
and will demand concrete and material results. Private enterprise today
is on trial solely because it is not producing the goods it has the capacity
to produce and because it is not providing a more equitable distribution
of the goods it is producing. 27
As did Schumpeter, Eccles saw danger to the preservation of democratic

capitalism in the development of a class without a stake in the survival of the system:
not the disenchanted intellectuals, students, or public servants of Schumpeter's
theory, but the unemployed. He warned that
Over twenty million people, or one-sixth of the population are being
supported by the federal government. In addition, there are millions
more being supported by their relatives or using up their savings. The
important thing from the point of view of capitalism is that these people
no longer have any stake in preserving our present economy. They have
nothing to lose. And if this condition persists much longer, or if it
recurs again in a few years, neither you nor I will have anything to
lose. 28
If, and only if, the problem of unemployment could be solved, a bright future
lay in store for capitalism. Eccles' views on the subject were summarized well in his
1939 "Credo," which said, in part:
If I had my choice, I would at all times have a balanced federal
budget. The difficulty is that an unbalanced budget is not an
independent condition created by a government decision--but a reflection
of deep-seated unbalance in the economy . . .. A policy of adequate
governmental outlays at a time when private enterprise is reducing its
expenditures does not reflect a preference for an unbalanced budget.
Experience has demonstrated that the budget cannot be balanced in
severe depression by either increasing taxes or decreasing expenditures,
or by doing both.
I contend that the volume of governmental
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expenditures should be increased in a depression, and should be so
planned, so timed, and so adequately scaled as to result in diminishing
the duration of the depression. If we are to pursue such a course, then
as prosperous conditions are restored, and as unemployment is absorbed
by private activity, we must be prepared to bring the budget into
balance, offsetting the dangers of a boom on the upswing as positively
as depression has been counteracted on the downswing ....
In my own thinking I distinguish between the social obligation of
a free democratic society and the economic guidance and regulation that
would lead to the greatest common good. It seems to me to be a
function of democratic government to enforce minimum standards of
decency, within the limits of the nation's resources, in all fields of
activity. A rich country like ours can afford to insist on a minimum
income for its families; a minimum age for schooling and employment;
a maximum age for retirement; decent and safe conditions of work;
increasing benefits for labor as productivity increases; adequate
protection and security for the aged and unemployed; and adequate
educational, health, and recreational facilities. Standards of honesty
and decency can well be set by government--resulting in a gradual
advance in the standards of conduct to be enforced in the final analysis
by the business community itself ....
But, Eccles concluded, "unless the nation can provide itself with an adequate
income in goods and services, the effort to enforce minimum standards of decency will
be a losing fight.

It

"Our major economic concern is now and at all times to assure employment. ,,29
''You have got to take care of the unemployed," Eccles had told the Finance
Committee, "or you are going to have a revolution in this country."

IV. Influences
... My own viewpoint has sometimes been erroneously identified with
that of Mr. Keynes, doubtless to his embarrassment . ...
Marriner S. Eccles, 1939
Until comparatively recently, I had never met Keynes, nor had I
ever, so far as I can recall, read or studied any of his works. We came
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out at about the same place in economic thought and policy by very
different roads.
Marriner S. Eccles, 1942
I know of no professors whose writings have influenced me.
Marriner S. Eccles, 1949
Eccles' contention that he had arrived at his economic philosophy without
having read or studied the works of John Maynard Keynes is accepted both by his
biographers and by his contemporaries. Sidney Hyman, author of the most recent
and complete biography of Eccles, simply reiterates Eccles' own account, as does Dean
May.30 Herbert Stein, in The Fiscal Revolution in America states that "Eccles had
not then, in the early 1930s, read anything by Keynes and never in his life read very
much by him ... 31 This opinion is also held by economists who knew and worked with
Eccles, such as Lauchlin Currie, Richard A. Musgrave, and John Kenneth Galbraith.
According to Milton Friedman, "Eccles was not influenced by Keynes or Keynes by
Eccles .... However, Eccles came to Washington with already fairly fully developed
ideas that would later be described as Keynesian in character ... 32
Though Eccles no doubt had forgotten by 1942, he had in fact read something
by Keynes in the early 1930s.

In a 1933 speech, Eccles quoted Keynes on the

difficulty of gaining public acceptance of deficit spending except in time of war. 33
This apparently limited exposure of Eccles to the writing of Keynes, coming as it did
after Eccles' own thinking on macroeconomics had matured, does no appreciable
damage to his claim of originality and independence. Nor does the fact that Eccles
met Keynes and corresponded with him at least as early as 1941, rather than 1943,
as is commonly believed. 34 If Eccles was not influenced by Keynes' early writings,
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he was equally unaffected by his later works. Lauchlin Currie, who was Eccles' first
and most important economic advisor, recalls that "(Eccles) never read Keynes'

General Theory, and he accepted the Keynesian arguments, when I summarized them
(in a written review prepared for Eccles in November 1936), as a matter of course.
Nothing new! ,,35
While no serious student of the development of macroeconomic policy has
claimed that Eccles' views were derived from Keynes, other influences have been
suggested. First, as Eccles

hiII~.self

writes, he found in the writings of Foster and

Catchings an analysis and a suggested cure for the depression which corresponded
to his own thinking.

How much of Eccles' philosophy can be attributed to this

exposure is problematic.

As ·Currie observes, "The only thing I remember wa!5

(Eccles) telling me once that he had been influenced by Foster and Catchings' book,
but whether because they convinced him or because they agreed with him, I do not
now recall. ,,36
Evsey Domar, who worked under Eccles at the Fed during the War, recalls that
Eccles never came to the Federal Reserve Seminar, which began in 1943 or 1944,
with Keynes ;being the first speaker.

"Somehow," Domar writes, "I have the

impression that he did not care much for academic economists. ,,37

Domar is

undoubtedly correct. In answer to a 1949 inquiry as to the source of his thinking,
Eccles said, ItI know of no professors whose writings have influenced me."

He

allowed, however, that eight individuals with whom Eccles worked at the Fed might
"have possibly had some influence on my thinking. ,,38 Among those eight were some,
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such as Lauchlin Currie, Alvin Hansen, and Richard Musgrave who had been and/or
would be "professors." Their influence on Eccles apparently came only through the
working relationship, not through their "academic" writings.

Even an active

involvement in practical problems of monetary and fiscal policy, however, was not
always sufficient to remove the taint of academics in Eccles' assessments. Richard
Musgrave recalls an occasion on which his attempt to defend Sproul's understanding
of economic principles to Eccles on the basis of Sproul's previous experience as a
professor of economics provoked the Fed Chairman's scorn.39 Musgrave concludes
that "economists undoubtedly influenced (Eccles') thinking, even though he denied
this. His discussion of public debt in particular strongly reflects (Alvin) Hansen's
position. ,,40 To what extent Eccles was influenced by academic economists, and vice
versa, is problematic. According to Milton Friedman, "the academic world was not
influenced by Eccles. ,,41 The academic world, however, was certainly aware of Eccles'
analysis and policy recommendations, as is indicated by his correspondence with
many prominent economists. Irving Fisher, then Professor Emeritus at Yale, was one
with whom Eccles had correspondence on several occasions. Although Fisher had
written a very favorable three-part essay on Eccles' views in 1935,42 Eccles did not
always agree with Fisher's, views. In 1938, for example, Eccles, in a draft reply for
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's signature, pointed out the flaws in a plan which was
being strongly urged on the President by Professor Fisher to bring about economic
recovery by monetizing the float. In submitting the draft, Eccles commented on such
plans pressed on the President, and concluded, "I am returning also, with a suggested
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reply as you requested, the correspondence from Professor Irving Fisher, who is much
more intelligent but certainly misled on this point.,,43 "Ifhe felt he was right," recalls
Currie, "he was not in the slightest impressed by 'authority' to the contrary. ,,44 This
characteristic was evident in his belief, contrary to the opinions and advice of his
economists, that the war would be followed by inflation, not deflation.
Quite aside from any influences from economists to which Eccles might have
been subjected during the early 1930s or later, the fact remains that he came to a
view of the workings of the macroeconomy which was practically unthinkable for one
from his background. Eccles, in conversation with Herbert Stein, offered two reasons
for arriving at unorthodox conclusions when others with his background did not.
First, being a country banker, Eccles saw the impact of the financial crisis earlier and
more forcefully than did big-city bankers. Second, because he had never attended
college, he had no orthodox economic theory to unlearn. 45 While appealing, this
explanation, as Alan Sweezy points out, would not stand up to statistical scrutiny,
as there must have been hundreds of other country bankers equally lacking in
college-level education, none of whom came to Eccles' conclusions. 46 While the factors
he mentions fnight have been important, perhaps even "necessary," they obviously
were not sufficient to explain the transformation in Eccles' thinking. Lauchlin Currie
has suggested that the key insight in the transformation--one which many
establishment economists failed to gain--was Eccles' discovery of the fallacy of
composition. "Our basic agreement," Currie writes, "came from the fact that he early
in the Depression sensed the Fallacy ofComposition--of applying accounting concepts
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appropriate to an individual to the whole community . . . . So far as I know Marriner
had worked this out for himself .... Certainly he was the first prominent banker
or businessman who publicly adopted and explained the difference between private
and public accounting concepts as applied to income statements. tt4 7 While Currie
identifies the key insight, he does not have a causal explanation for Eccles' obtaining
of it.

"On ... the explanation for the advanced nature of his analysis, It Currie

concludes, ttl can only suggest that he was what in biology is called a mutation! 1148
Sweezy provides a more concrete explanation: "The explanation ... is that Eccles
combined unusual ability to cut through to the essentials of an economic argument
with the intellectual independence and courage to say publicly exactly what he
thought. ,,49
There has been a suggestion that Eccles' Mormon background might have
preconditioned him to see a role for government in overall economic planning and
stabilization. The history of strong central direction and control characteristic of
Mormon economic policy throughout the last half of the nineteenth century, and the
combination of self-reliance and cooperation ("Jacksonian Cooperation tt ) which marked
Mormon socioeconomic institutions throughout the history of the church might have
allowed Eccles to see possibilities of superimposing overt government macroeconomic
stabilization policy on a framework of individualistic private enterprise in ways which
would have (and did!) seemed contradictory to bankers, businessmen, and
industrialists from more orthodox backgrounds. This is the explanation strongly
favored by Dean May and Jonathan Hughes. 50
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Whatever the explanation or explanations for the evolution of Marriner Eccles'
ideas on macroeconomic theory and policy--and undoubtedly many factors were
involved, his was a remarkable intellectual accomplishment, placing him among the
earliest of the American precursors of Keynes. More importantly, Eccles, convinced
of the correctness of the principles he espoused, became the leading economic
spokesman of the Roosevelt Administration and the most important figure in the
introduction of modern macroeconomic stabilization policies in the United States.
Richard A. Musgrave, who was Eccles' personal assistant from 1944 to 1948,
considers Eccles as "a great figure in a crucial period of our history ... an
extraordinary figure, with a great deal of insight and courage." "It is easy," writes
Musgrave, "for an academic to belittle theoretical qualities in a man of action such
as Eccles; yet which academic, other than Keynes, was as important in implementing
a modern view of macro policy into actual policy measures?,,51 Milton Friedman
would go further. ttl believe [Eccles] played a far greater role in the development of
what came later to be called Keynesian policies," he states, "than did Keynes or any
of his disciples. ,,52
In 1951,., Marriner Eccles made his last stand in Washington. Making public
the duplicity of the Treasury Department and President Truman in attempting to
transfer control of monetary policy from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury, Eccles
won his most famous victory. It was for this success in rescuing the independence
of the Fed from the executive branch of government that Eccles is primarily
remembered. When he retired from active public service later that year, Eccles left
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Washington frustrated with the slowness of policy-makers to recognize the compelling
economic logic of compensatory finance. It had taken until 1938 to convince F.D.R.
of the efficacy of countercyclical stabilization policies. There seemed to be little
indication that Congress would be willing to pass contractionary fiscal legislation
necessary to combat postwar inflation. For the next quarter century, while Eccles
successfully directed his considerable abilities to the economic development of the
Intermountain West, he continued to speak out forcefully on domestic and foreign
affairs, always with the careful analysis, clear logic, and command of facts that had
characterized his Washington years.
Jonathan Hughes, the well-known economic historian, in his seminal book on
entrepreneurship in American economic history, The Vital Few, uses Eccles as an
example of entrepreneurship in the public sector. Hughes, himself a Utah native,
concludes his assessment of Eccles this way:
So who was Marriner Eccles? He was an example of the very best
this country could ever produce. We never got the benefits of his life
and abilities that were possible. But that's the way we are. We soldier
on in our bumbling way, a democracy, good and bad, wise and foolish.
As the saying goes, "Every dog has his day," and since we are a lucky
country, once in a while a Marriner Eccles comes along.
Fpr the memory of Eccles one has a warm feeling, knowing what
his standards were, and that he lived and died facing them:
The World has need of willing men,
Who wear the worker's seal;
Come, help the good work move along;
Put your shoulder to the wheel.
The music of a Utah childhood, long ago. 53
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Marriner Eccles was a paradox: a developer of economic theory who expressed
an intense dislike of "theory" and

categor~cally

denied being an economist; a

self-styled "conservative Republican businessman-banker" who served a Democratic
President and delighted in pointing out logical inconsistencies and backwardness in
the thinking and statements of bankers and businessmen; and a defender of the
advantages of a free-enterprise market economy who believed that only significant
government intervention in the economy could save the system.
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